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William Fuchs

Professor

Department:     Finance

William’s research focuses on situations with a poor contractual environment due to asymmetric information or lack of formal enforcement. He studies how repeated interactions or policies can be used to partially overcome the underlying frictions.
His work, which has been published in some of the most important journals, is mostly theoretical and carried out at a relatively high level of abstraction, but the insights gathered can be widely applied from the design of transnational institutions, to the design of contracts within an organization, and the regulation of diverse markets by governments. [More on his research]
William’s research has also been supported by some of the most prestigious grants, including two NSF Grants and a Consolidator Grant from the European Research Council.

ACADEMIC LEADERSHIP & AWARDS

2021-22

McCombs Award for Research Excellence

Publications

Self-enforcing Contracts with Persistence. By: Martin Dumav, William Fuchs, and Jangwoo Lee. Journal of Monetary Economics. May 2022. Vol. 128: 72-87.

William Fuchs, Brett Green, and David Levine. Optimal Arrangements for Distribution in Developing Markets: Theory and Evidence. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, forthcoming.

 

Vladimir Asriyan, William Fuchs, and Brett Green. 2021. Aggregation and Design of Information in Markets with Adverse Selection. Journal of Economic Theory 191, 105124.

 

William Fuchs and Andrzej Skrzypacz. 2019. Costs and Benefits of Dynamic Trading in a Lemons Market. Review of Economic Dynamics 33, 105-127.

 

Vinicius Carrasco, William Fuchs, and Satoshi Fukuda. 2019. From Equals to Despots: The Dynamics of Repeated Decision Making with Private Information. Journal of Economic Theory 182, 402-432.

 

William Fuchs, Vladimir Asriyan, and Brett Grett. 2019. Liquidity Sentiments. American Economic Review 109(11), 3813-3848.

 

Vladimir Asriyan, William Fuchs, and Brett Green. 2017. Information Spillovers in Asset Markets with Correlated Values. American Economic Review 107(7), 2007-2040.

 

William Fuchs, Brett Green, and Dimitris Papanikolauo. 2016. Adverse Selection, Slow-Moving Capital, and Misallocation. Journal of Financial Economics 120(2), 286-308.

 

William Fuchs, Aniko Oery, and Andy Skrzypacz. 2016. Transparency and Distressed Sales under Asymmetric Information. Theoretical Economics Sept 12.

 

William Fuchs and Andy Skrzypacz. 2015. Government Interventions in a Dynamic Market with Adverse Selection. Journal of Economic Theory158(A), 371-406.

 

William Fuchs, Luis Garicano, and Luis Rayo. 2015. Optimal Contracting and the Organization of Knowledge. Review of Economic Studies 82(2), 632-658.

 

William Fuchs. 2015. Subjective Evaluations: Discretionary Bonuses and Feedback Credibility. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7(1), 99-108.

 

William Fuchs and Andy Skrzypacz. 2013. Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5(4), 219-43.

 

William Fuchs and Andy Skrzypacz. 2013. Bridging the Gap: Bargaining with Interdependent Values. Journal of Economic Theory 148(3), 1226-1236.

 

William Fuchs and Andy Skrzypacz. 2010. Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders. American Economic Review 100(3), 802-36.

 

William Fuchs and Luis Garicano. 2010. Matching Problems with Expertise in Firms and Markets. Journal of the European Economic Association 8(2/3), 354-64.

 

William Fuchs. 2007. Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations [Landau Prize for Best Student Working Paper]. American Economic Review 97(4), 1432-48.

 

William Fuchs and Francesco Lippi. 2006. Monetary Union with Voluntary Participation [CEPR/ESI Prize 2004 for the Best Central Bank Research Paper]. Review of Economic Studies 73(2), 437-57.